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THE RIGHT TO MANAGE PRIVATE PROPERTY:

AN

ANALYSIS OF WHETHER INVESTOR-OWNED
UTILITIES HAVE THE RIGHT TO MANAGE
THEIR OWN BUSINESS
By

RICHARD

A.

WESTFALL*

We have no doubt that the freedom to make use of one's own property...
whether in pursuit of business or pleasure, is a 'liberty' which under the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be denied or curtailed by a state without
due process of law. I
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last 100 years, our country's view of the sanctity of private
property rights has changed dramatically. From a period when private
property was protected with almost religious zeal by our Supreme
Court, we have evolved to where many facets of the institution of property are subject to government scrutiny. The zenith of such governmental control and the correlative nadir of private prerogative is illustrated
by the regulation of this nation's investor-owned public utility industry.
Ever since the landmark decision of Munn v. Illinois,2 our country
has recognized that public utilities are subject to more onerous regulation than other businesses. Writing for the Court in Munn, ChiefJustice
Waite stated that utilities are "affected with a public interest," and accordingly, the public has a greater stake in the service provided by such
businesses. 3 Because of this greater stake, the public can legislatively
impose conditions and restrictions on public utilities which are not imposable on other businesses. These restrictions include limits on the
4
prices which utilities can charge for their services.
Utilities are, therefore, more susceptible to government regulation
than other private companies. This fact has led to extensive state and
federal regulation covering most facets of the business. Nevertheless,
* B.S. University of Colorado (1978);J.D. University of Denver (1985); Clerk to the
Honorable Byron R. White, United States Supreme Court (1986-87); Clerk to the Honorable Robert H. McWilliams, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (1985-86); former Senior Policy Analyst, Public Service Company of Colorado.
1. Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953).
2. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
3. Id. at 126. Actually, the phrase "affected with a public interest" is borrowed from
an earlier work by Lord Hale, De Portibus Maris, noted in Munn. The public has a greater
stake in the services provided by public utilities primarily because such services are often
considered as necessities. For example, Lord Hale was concerned with such things as ferries and wharfs which played an essential role in England's economy in the late 1600s
when he articulated the "affected with a public interest" principle. Munn, 94 U.S. at 12627.
4. Id.at 134.
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until recently, utility companies retained control over their most important business decisions. For example, electric and gas utilities, the primary focus of this article, could choose which suppliers of coal and gas
they would do business with, what kinds of power plants they could
build, when they could build them, and what they could say to their customers. However, a trend has emerged in recent years wherein state
regulators have tried to take these decisions away from the companies
they regulate. This development portends a major and fundamental
change in the investor-owned utility industry; a change which may have
long-term, harmful consequences.
In analyzing this new regulatory trend, there are some important
questions which must be explored. Do utility companies enjoy some legally protected right to manage their own property? If so, why, and
what is the scope of such a right? Finally, if state utility commissions are
encroaching upon this right, what are the implications?
The importance of answering these questions extends far beyond
the utility industry. By seeking to determine how far state regulators can
intrude on managerial decisionmaking in the most highly regulated industry in this country, the absolute limits of state power over private
property can be better understood; and the line between what is "private" power and what is "public" power in our society can be more
readily drawn. 5
This article will first discuss some of the regulatory practices which
initiated the concern that state regulators have usurped private decisionmaking from the companies they regulate. It will then analyze whether a
right to manage exists, the scope of the right to manage, and why such a
right exists. Finally, this article will discuss some of the implications for
taking decisionmaking out of the hands of utility company managers and
placing it in the hands of state regulators.
II.

THE

NEW

REGULATORY PHENOMENON:

MANAGEMENT

BY REGULATORS

A.

A Brief Historical Perspective

State utility regulation as it exists today started in 1907 when, recognizing the need for professional, continuous regulation over the natural monopolies which furnished the public with energy, water, and
telephone services, the State of Wisconsin passed legislation creating a
specialized state utility commission. 6 This statute provided a model
which was followed by the rest of the states in one form or another. 7
5. See infra notes 51-74 and accompanying text.
6. P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoy, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 34 (1964) [hereinafter
GARFIELD & LovEjoy]. It is also important to note the significant contribution of New York

which passed an act creating two public service commissions on June 6, 1907. Laws of
1907, ch. 429. Wisconsin did not enact its comprehensive public utility law until July 9,

1907. Laws of 1907, ch. 499.
7. GARFIELD & LovEjoY, supra note 6. The state public utility commission movement
spread throughout the nation so rapidly that by 1913 more than one half of the states had
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Under this statutory scheme, state utility commissions were formed and
usually consisted of between three to seven people. These commissions
set rates, implemented utility statutes by promulgating rules and regulations, and insured that the service provided by utilities was adequate. 8
Congress also created a federal regulatory body called the Federal
Power Commission 9 - later changed to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission' 0 - for the purpose of regulating interstate sales of
energy.
Early United States Supreme Court decisions reviewing the power
of the states to regulate utilities were strict. For example, in Smyth v.
Ames, 11 the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling holding a state
statute which fixed maximum rates for railroads as unconstitutional
under the fourteenth amendment. 12 In so doing, the Supreme Court
put the states on a short leash, forcing all states to comply with the "fair
value" formula 13 which was designed by the Court for computing what
rates would pass constitutional muster. This "short leash" treatment
and its accompanying "fair value" formula were later exhibited in a
number of other cases, including, The Minnesota Rate Cases, 14 Missouri ex
public utility commissions. See generally E. JONES AND T. BIGHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES 163-90 (1932).

8. GARFIELD & LOVEJOY, supra note 6, at 32. See also Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to
Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1962).
9. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 813 (1920).
10. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-95, 91 Stat. 565, 582
(1977).
11. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
12. It should be noted that Smyth resulted from a rate determination made by a state
legislature, before that state had a specialized utility commission.
The Supreme Court, after extensively surveying its caselaw decided since Munn dealing with rate regulation, made, inter alia, the following conclusions:
2. A state enactment, or regulations made under the authority ot a state
enactment, establishing rates for the transportation of persons or property by
railroad [or the rates of any utility for that matter] that will not admit of the carrier earning such compensation as under all the circumstances is just to it and to
the public, would deprive such carrier of its property without due process of law
and deny to it the equal protection of the laws, and would therefore be repugnant
to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
3. While rates for the transportation of persons and property within the
limits of a State are primarily for its determination, the question whether they are
so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property without such compensation as the Constitution secures, and therefore without due process of law,
cannot be so conclusively determined by the legislature of the State or by regulations adopted under its authority, that the matter may not become the subject of
judicial inquiry.
169 U.S. at 526.
13. Id. at 546-47. The Court stated "that the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation... must be the fair value of the property
being used by it for the convenience of the public." Id. at 546.
14. 230 U.S. 352 (1913). In this case, the Court made the following observation indicating the strictness of the Supreme Court's review of state regulation of utility property:
The property of the railroad corporation has been devoted to a public use.
There is always the obligation springing from the nature of the business in which
it is engaged - which private exigency may not be permitted to ignore - that
there shall not be an exorbitant charge for the service rendered. But the State
has not seen fit to undertake the service itself; and the private property embarked
in it is not placed at the mercy of legislative caprice. It rests secure under the
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rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 15 and espe16
cially Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough.
This strict judicial treatment of state regulatory power yielded to a
far more flexible approach in the 1940s through some major Supreme
Court decisions which dealt with the general question of judicial review
of administrative action. The leading proponent of this change was Justice Brandeis. In a number of dissenting and concurring opinions, Justice Brandeis articulated the view that regulatory commission decisions
should be given more deference by the courts. 17 Other important commentators of that period also forcefully argued that regulatory agencies
should be given more control.' 8 Thus, in what were to become
landmark decisions of the early 1940s, the Supreme Court changed its
position, ruling that regulatory agency decisions were to be given more
deference by the courts.
In Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. ,'9 ChiefJustice
Stone made the following observation:
The Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the
service of any single formula or combination of formulas.
Agencies to whom this legislative power has been delegated are
free, within the ambit of their statutory authority, to make the
constitutional protection which extends not merely to the title but to the right to
receive just compensation for the service given to the public.
Id. at 433-34.
15. 262 U.S. 276, 287-88 (1923) (The court held that "a fair return upon value of
properties devoted to public service" could not be ascertained without considering the
present cost of labor, supplies, and "[a]n honest and intelligent forecast of probable future
values made upon a view of all the relevant circumstances.").
16. 253 U.S. 287 (1920) (requiring, in effect, judicial de novo review of utility commission decision when regulated utility claims that rate regulation denies it property without
due process of law).
17. For example, in SaintJoseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936),
Justice Brandeis, concurring with the result reached by the Court involving a federal
agency ratemaking proceeding, argued that regulatory agencies should have greater
discretion:
The obstacles encountered in the case at bar and in the regulation of the
rates of the large utilities are attributable, in the main, to the Court's adherence
to the rule declared in Smyth v. Ames for determining the value of the property. In
Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, I stated my
reasons for believing that the Constitution did not require the Court to adopt that
rule which so seriously impairs the power of rate-regulation. But since the decision of Smyth v. Ames is adhered to, there is the greater need of applying to cases
in which rate-regulation is alleged to be confiscatory to the rule of reason under
which the Court has sanctioned, in other cases of taking, the legislative provision
giving finality to quasi-judicial findings of value and income by administrative
tribunals.
...
Congress concluded that a wealthy and litigious utility might practically
nullify rate regulation if the correctness of findings by the regulating body of the
facts as to value and income were made subject to judicial review. For that conclusion experience affords ample basis. I cannot believe that the Constitution,
which confers upon Congress the power of rate-regulation, denies to it power to
adopt measures indispensible to its effective exercise.
Id. at 92-93 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See also St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry.
Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 488-548 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
18. E.g., J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 126-54 (1938). See generally J.
Pfiffner, The Development of Administrative Regulation, 221 ANNALS 1 (1942).
19. 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
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pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular
circumstances. Once a fair hearing has been given, proper
findings made and other statutory requirements satisfied, the
courts cannot intervene in the absence of a clear showing that
the limits of due process have been overstepped. If the Commission's order, as applied to the facts before it and viewed in
its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at an
20
end.
In Natural Gas Pipeline, the Court thwarted a challenge to an interim order issued by the Federal Power Commission which directed natural gas
companies to file a new schedule of rates so as to effect a decrease in
annual operating revenues. 2 1 While the Court held that no single
formula needed to be adopted and followed in order to determine fair
value, it intimated that some type of rate base was necessary and refused
to overrule the well-established "fair value" factors. Following Natural
Gas Pipeline, however, the Supreme Court decided Federal Power Commission v. Hope NaturalGas Co. 22 wherein it announced the "end result" doctrine, under which a regulatory agency can generally use any statutorily
acceptable means to set rates, so long as the "end result" is not unjust
or unreasonable. 2 3 Hope and Natural Gas Pipeline began the era, continuing until the present, in which the courts have followed a much more
24
deferential approach to all administrative decisionmaking.
This change in the Court's view of judicial oversight of administrative decisionmaking was necessary, especially since the very purpose of
professional, specialized regulatory bodies is frustrated when the courts
are forever looking over the regulators' shoulders. But this deferential
approach to administrative action affecting regulated companies has led
to some extreme examples of state regulation of investor-owned utilities. As the next section illustrates, a trend is emerging wherein state
20. Id. at 586.
21. Id. at 580.
22. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
23. Id. at 602. It should be pointed out that this "end-result" analysis applies only to
the methods used by regulatory agencies to set rates. In other words, under Hope, the
courts will not second-guess how the regulatory agencies compute what is an adequate
return to the utilities. The Hope case, however, has no relevance to the issue of how far
regulators can encroach on management decisionmaking.
24. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to overturn a
"fuel cycle" rule adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission for considering the environmental impact associated with nuclear fuel reprocessing and disposal, the effect of which
was to deny a license to operate a nuclear reactor to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corporation. Vermont Yankee is indicative of the deference accorded administrative decisionmaking by the courts. Indeed,Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Vermont Yankee, chided the Court of Appeals for intruding into the administrative process by stating
that "this sort of unwarranted judicial examination of perceived procedural shortcomings
of a rulemaking proceeding can do nothing but seriously interfere with that process prescribed by Congress." Id. at 548. Rehnquist further stated that "[t]he court should.., not
stray beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to impose upon the
agency its own notion of which procedures are 'best' or most likely to further some vague,
undefined public good." Id. at 549. See generally 5 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 29.16, 29.19 (2d ed. 1984).
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regulators are beginning to take over the management of the investorowned utilities they regulate - a development warranting a serious
reappraisal of the regulators' role.
B.

State Regulation Today

The most troublesome major development in state utility regulation
today is what can be described as "resource-plan" regulation. The leading example of such regulation is Nevada's General Order Number 43,
which was adopted by the Nevada Public Service Commission in response to legislation passed in 1983 entitled the Utility Resource Planning Act. 25 This regulation, in effect, makes the Nevada Commission
primarily responsible for planning future energy development in that
state, thus usurping the role of utility company management. As authorized by statute, Nevada's utility companies are required to submit detailed energy plans to the Commission. 26 The regulation requires that
these plans reduce every future energy-supply decision to an
econometric model detailing every assumption, and requires that every
27
possible choice concerning future energy development be included.
The Commission has veto power over any item contained in the plan
thereby giving it the ultimate management control over the decision28
making process.
One Nevada commissioner who was primarily responsible for the
drafting of the regulation has acknowledged that this new regulatory
29
scheme is a radical departure from traditional utility regulation.
Moreover, Nevada's statutorily authorized Consumer Advocate has asserted that the approach inherent in this regulatory scheme has a definite ideological thrust, 30 one against which many utility companies have
strenuously fought. 3 1 Undoubtedly, Nevada's regulatory scheme is a
regulator-defined, predetermined approach to energy development in
25. 1983 NEV. STAT. § 5.2 (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 704.741, 704.746, 704.75 1,
704.890 (1985)).
26. NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.741 (1985).
27. For a discussion summarizing the regulation, see J. Wellinghoff & C. Mitchell, A
Modelfor Statewide Integrated Utility Resource Planning, 116 PUB. UTxL. FORT. 19, 25 (August 8,

1985).
28.

NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 704.751 (1985).

29. R. Haman-Guild, State Involvement in Utility Resource Planning: Towards Partnership,

115 PUB. UrIL. FORT. 22, 22-23 (April 18, 1985). Ms. Haman-Guild observed that:
[bIringing a regulatory body into a utility's resource planning process ... goes
against long standing traditions of utility regulation: that 'hindsight' shall govern
the process of regulatory decisionmaking, and that 'prudence' and 'reasonableness' shall be decided after the fact, when regulators have access to a (theoretically) complete set of facts and information.
Id. at 22. Ms. Haman-Guild further noted that utility management in the state was concerned that the legislation authorizing the regulation "preempted management's right to
make investment decisions for its stockholders .... " Id. at 23.
30. Wellinghoff& Mitchell, supra note 27, at 19. The authors mention an "emerging
public policy awareness that a least-cost energy strategy [such as that implemented by Nevada] could make good business sense for public utilities." Id.
31. Wellinghoff & Mitchell, supra note 27, states that the regulatory scheme is
designed to address the so-called "soft energy path" espoused by Amory Lovins. See A.
LovINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS (1977).
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that state. There is also no doubt that Nevada's scheme removes decisionmaking from utility managers in that state, and places it in the hands
of Nevada's utility commission.
Other states have adopted some form of resource-planning regulation. 3 2 Additionally, the trade association for the state utility commissions, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, has
formally adopted a resolution calling for nationwide implementation of
Nevada-like resource plan regulation.53 The pervasive intrusion by regulators into the management of the utilities they are regulating is illustrated by state utility commissions that have imposed conditions on
utilities' business practices. For example, state utility commissions have
forced power companies to renegotiate their debt, 3 4 omit dividends and
limit capital expenses, 35 and complete the construction of a power
plant.3 6 State regulators have even gone so far as to try to tell utility
companies what they can and cannot say to their customers, although
the Supreme Court has recently struck down such regulation. 3 7 It is,
therefore, beyond dispute that this phenomenon of regulator-initiated
and controlled energy planning is a significant emerging trend in state
utility regulation.
What are the consequences of the encroachment by utility regulators upon what has traditionally been management's role? Some would
argue that the investor-owned utility industry is obsolete, thereby justifying what can be perceived as its political demise. 3 8 But before the fun32. Wellinghoff & Mitchell, supra note 27 at 20-24. The article discusses resource
planning objectives similar to those of the Nevada plan incorporated by the following jurisdictions: the Pacific Northwest, California, Florida, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
33.

Convention Resolution No. 7, NAT'L ASSN. OF REG. UTIL. COMM'RS (NARUC)
(Jan. 14, 1985).

BULL. No. 2

34. As noted in Consumer Power Company's "Interim Report to Shareholders,"
March 31, 1985, the Michigan Public Service Commission informed the Company it would
grant it a rate increase, but only after, inter alia, the company renegotiated a major portion
of its debt with its creditor banks. Moreover, as reported in the Wall Street Journal, the
Michigan Commission earlier wanted to condition any rate hike on the company's firing of
its chief executive. Departure of Consumers Power Head is Urged by State Official in Rate Case,
Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1984, at 5, col. 2.
35. The Indiana Public Service Commission told Public Service Company of Indiana
that it could write off over $2 billion invested in an abandoned nuclear plant, but only after
the company agreed to omit certain dividends and limit its capital expenses. Richards, PS
Indiana to Omit Dividends in Plan To Write Off $2.7 Billion Nuclear Plant, Wall St. J., Feb. 3,
1986, at 6, col. 2.
36. According to a bulletin by NARUC, No. 8-1983m at 19 (February 21, 1983), the
New York Public Service Commission rejected a proposal by the Long Island Lighting
Company to establish a subsidiary. The reason given was that the Commission thought
that the company's management should devote more of its attention to the completion of a
power plant then under construction.
37. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986), see infra
notes 63-74 and accompanying text. See also Consolidated Edision Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (The Supreme Court recognized that administrative
bodies empowered to regulate utilities have the authority and the duty to take actions
necessary to further the national interest in energy conservation. But when such action
suppresses free speech the Constitution requires that the restriction be no more extensive
than is necessary to serve legitimate state interests.); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
38.

See generally R. MUNSON, THE POWER MAKERS 9-12 (1985). Munson goes so far as
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damental decisions concerning this country's energy future are to be
taken away from utility management and placed in the hands of state
regulators, an open and informed debate should first take place. Central to this debate is the issue of whether utility companies have some
protected right to manage their property. For if such a right exists, it
exists for a reason. If the reason is still valid, the important decisions
affecting this country's energy future should remain in management's
hands, not state regulators'.
III.

THE RIGHT

To

MANAGE

In Board of Regents v. Roth,3 9 the Supreme Court made the following
observation concerning the nature of property interests:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law - rules or understandand that support claims of entiings that secure certain benefits
40
tlement to those benefits.
What the Constitution does provide for, however, is the protection of
these rights once they are created. For example, as noted by the quote
appearing at the beginning of this article, the "liberty" interest of using
is
one's own property in the manner in which he, she, or it4 1 wishes 42
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Specifically, in the context of the utility industry, that clause also protects utilities from being subjected to rate regulation which is
43
confiscatory.
Property rights, though, are not absolute. As announced by the
Supreme Court in Nebbia v. New York, 44 at least insofar as economic regulation is concerned, the states have considerable discretion in regulating businesses when to do so promotes the public welfare. 4 5 Utilities
are subject to extensive regulation because of the importance of the
services they provide to the public. 4 6 Therefore, by definition, any
to imply that utility bankruptcies would actually be advantageous to consumers: "If the
local impacts of the first utility bankruptcy are similarly tame-in other words, if the lights
stay on-regulators in other states may deny rate relief to their troubled power companies,
while consumers increase their political willingness to 'stick it to investors.' " Id. at 12.
39. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
40. Id. at 577.
41. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886), the
Supreme Court announced that corporations are "persons" within the meaning of U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
42. Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953).
43. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942)
(unreasonably low regulation rate is confiscatory and unconstitutional). See also H. Booser,
The Constitutional Limitations on Public Utility Regulation, 67 DICK. L. REV. 363 (1963).
44. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (regulation of milk prices held to be constitutional since protection of dairy industry promoted public welfare).
45. Id. at 537.
46. In Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923), the
Supreme Court discussed a principle which applies with equal force today: A "slidingscale," of sorts, exists in the area of public regulation of private business. The greater the
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property rights a utility may have, including the right to manage its own
property, are subject to some regulation. The issues then become, the
extent and the manner of such regulation.
It is important to note that even the most protected forms of property, such as a vested interest in real estate, can be taken by the state as
long as the property owner is given due process of law. 4 7 The fourteenth amendment's protection, by its very terms, makes this proposition clear. 4 8 Therefore, even if utility companies have the right to
manage their own property, this right can be taken away, so long as the
state provides the utility with due process of law. Consequently, the
burden is on the state to articulate the reason why state regulators
should be given the power to make the important decisions affecting our
energy future. 49 The degree to which the courts will scrutinize any articulated justification given by the state for assuming the right to manage will, in turn, depend upon how fundamental the right to manage is
50
viewed by the courts.
public's concern in a particular business, the more regulation of that business will be tolerated. According to the Court:
To say that a business is clothed with a public interest, is not to determine
what regulation may be permissible in view of the private rights of the owner.
The extent to which an inn or a cab system may be regulated may differ widely
from that allowable as to a railroad or other common carrier. It is not a matter of
legislative discretion solely. It depends on the nature of the business, on the feature which touches the public, and on the abuses reasonably to be feared. To say
that a business is clothed with a public interest is not to import that the public may take over its
entire management and run it at the expense of the owner. The extent to which regulation
may reasonably go varies with different kinds of business. The regulation of rates
to avoid monopoly is one thing. The regulation of wages is another. A business
may be of such character that only the first is permissible, while another may
involve such a possible danger of monopoly on the one hand, and such disaster
from stoppage on the other, that both come within the public concern and power
of regulation.
Id. at 539 (emphasis added). It is important to note that this discussion by the Supreme
Court acknowledging the state's extensive power to regulate nevertheless expressly excepted from such power the right to "take over" management of the regulated company.
47. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (upholding Indiana statute making retention of severed mineral interests in land conditioned upon filing a statement of claim
with the state).
48. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. An example of such due process is found in the statutory scheme regulating utilities in Colorado. Under CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-3-101 (1973), utility companies in that
state are charged with providing service that is "adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable."
The very next statutory provision empowers the Colorado utility commission to ensure
that the utilities live up to these obligations. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-102 (1973). To
correct any abuses by a Colorado utility, however, the Commission must first hold hearings, and make a formal finding that the abuse exists. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 40-4-101, 40-2106 (1973). Such a finding is then subject to judicial review. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-6-115
(1973). See Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 285, 411
P.2d 785, 797 (court not only has right to review but is obligated to do so), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 22 (1966).
50. The degree ofjudicial review afforded today reflects the view expressed by Justice
Holmes in his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In dissenting
from the Court's opinion invalidating a statute regulating the number of hours a baker
could work, Holmes stated the following:
Every opinion tends to become a law. I think that the word 'liberty' in the Fourteenth Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome
of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessar-
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How fundamental is the right to manage, if it exists at all? This
question strikes at the heart of the concept of private property. Charles
Reich has described property as the tool by which society distinguishes
between public and private power. 5 1 By defining a person's property
rights, the law, in effect, draws a circle around that person. 52 Within
that circle, the person has a great degree of control, and the burden is
on the state to justify any intrusion. Outside the circle, the burden is on
the person to show the authority for his actions. 53 Thus, if the state
wants to affect a protected property right, the state must show why the
public interest will benefit.
Beyond this procedural point, there is another reason for distinguishing between public and private power. John Locke was of the view
that the concept of private property insures the most advantageous use
of our resources. In the early stages of man's development, man is afforded a property right because, through his labor, resources of little
54
value are transformed into things of great value to himself and others.
As society becomes more advanced and industrialized, however, it becomes necessary to settle, by "compact and agreement," the property
rights of all persons in society, so as to allow for the production of goods
now taken for granted in a civilized society. 5 5 The thrust of Locke's conception of property is a principle equally as valid today: preserving private property rights leads to the greatest good for the greatest number
of people. 56 The role of government, according to Locke, is to preserve
private property. 5 7 Thus, under Locke's view, private industry is given the
responsibility for insuring the development of our material wealth, not
government.
Early decisions by the Supreme Court strongly enforced the publicprivate distinction in the regulation of utilities. Perhaps the most famous articulation of this principle is found in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
ily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles
as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.
Id. at 76 (HolmesJ., dissenting). Thus, underJustice Holmes's view, legislation or regulation which infringes upon fundamental principles should be struck down. Application of
this view can indeed be seen today and specifically in the public-utility context. For example, in Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986), the
Supreme Court invalidated a regulation requiring a company to include in its bills hostile
messages from an activist organization that opposed the company in proceedings before
the state utility commission. The concurrence byJustice Marshall makes it clear that one of
the major reasons the Court struck down the regulation was that the company's fundamental right of access to and use of its own property, i.e., its billing envelope, was substantially
infringed upon by the state without adequate justification. Id. at 914 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
51. C. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733, 771 (1964).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 129 (Everyman's Library ed. 1924).

55. Id. at 137-40.
56. It is interesting that Locke appreciated the usefulness of feedstocks and the value
they have for all of society, id. at 137-38. Perhaps the most valuable feedstock today is
electricity.
57. Id. at 187.
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Bell Telephone Co. v. PublicService Commission,5 8 where Justice McReynolds
declared:
It must never be forgotten that while the State may regulate with a view to enforcing reasonable rates and charges, it is
not the owner of the property of public utility companies, and
is not clothed with the general power of management incident
to ownership. The applicable general rule is well expressed in
State Public Utilities Commission ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield Gas
and Electric Company, 291 Ill. 209, 234.
'The commission is not the financial manager of the corporation, and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the directors of the corporation; nor can it ignore items
charged by the utility as operating expenses unless there is an
abuse of discretion in that regard by the corporate officers.' 59
Thus, the court distinguished the regulatory function of the states from
the ownership rights of the public utility companies. This same principle was stated with equal strength in discussing the property rights of
railroads. 60 Management is responsible for making business decisions
and regulators are responsible for insuring, that in making these decisions, management does not unreasonably harm the public. 6 ' More recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of labor show that the Court is
still respectful of the rights of businesses to manage their own affairs. 6 2
The importance of recognizing utility companies' right to manage
cannot be understated. As evidenced by Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission,63 state regulators can infringe on utilities' fundamen58.
59.
60.
(1908),

262 U.S. 276 (1923).
Id. at 289.
In Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. 108
the Supreme Court made the following statement:
It must be remembered that railroads are the private property of their owners; that while, from the public character of the work in which they are engaged,
the public has the power to prescribe rules for securing faithful and efficient service and equality between shippers and communities, yet, in no proper sense, is
the public a general manager. As said in Int. Com. Com. v. Ala. Mid. R. R. Co., 168
U.S. 144, 172, quoting from the opinion of Circuit Judge Jackson, later Mr. Justice Jackson of this Court, in Int. Com. Com. v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 37,
50:
'Subject to the two leading prohibitions that their charges shall not be unjust
or unreasonable, and that they shall not unjustly discriminate so as to give undue
preference or disadvantage to persons or traffic similarly circumstanced, the act
to regulate commerce leaves common carriers, as they were at the common law,
free to make special rates looking to the increase of their business, to classify their
traffic, to adjust and apportion their rates so as to meet the necessities of commerce and of their own situation and relation to it, and generally to manage their
important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound and
adopted in other trades and pursuits.'
Id. at 119. See also Great N. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. State R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n,
238 U.S. 340 (1915).
61. See Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. at 119.
62. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 573 n.22 (1978) (An employer may
prevent distribution of literature on his property which threatens business functions.);
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-22 (1976) (Employees had no first amendment right
to strike against employer located in privately-owned shopping center.); Central Hardware
v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543-45 (1972) (non-employee, no-solicitation rule upheld).
63. 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

tal rights 64 only by asserting a substantially relevant correlation between
the compelling interest sought to be protected and the means chosen to
achieve that compelling interest.6 5 The state must make a compelling
case for taking decisionmaking away from the utilities. In Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., Justice Powell, expressing the view of a plurality of the
Court,6 6 held "that the Commission's order impermissibly burden[ed
the utility's] First Amendment rights because it force[d] appellant to asit select[ed] the
sociate with the views of other speakers, and because
67
other speakers on the basis of their viewpoints."
It is important to note that one argument used by the state to justify
its regulation in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 68 was that the company had no
property interest in its own billing envelopes and thus no constitutionally protected right to restrict access to them. 6 9 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, stating that "[w]here, as in this case, the danger
is one that arises from a content-based grant of access to private property, it is a danger that the government may not impose absent a compelling interest."' 70 The Court found that the state's argument, that the
utility had no property right in its billing envelopes, "misperceives ...
the relevant property rights." 7 1 Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurrence that the state could not force the company to carry the
messages of others in its "property used in the conduct of its business." 72 Chief Justice Marshall was the most forceful of all in his view
that the state could not "redefine its common-law property rights" by
preventing the company from "deny[ing] access to its property - its
billing envelope." 7 3 In his concurring opinion, Marshall specifically recognized that as long as utility company property remains in private
hands, the state's ability to control that property is limited.
The State seizes upon appellant's status as a regulated monopoly in order to argue that the inclusion of postage and
other billing costs in the utility's rate base demonstrates that
these items 'belong' to the public, which has paid for them.
However, a consumer who purchases food in a grocery store is
'paying' for the store's rent, heat, electricity, wages, etc., but no
one would seriously argue that the consumer thereby acquires
a property interest in the store. That the utility passes on its over64.

In

Pacific Gas & Ekc. Co.,

both first amendment and property rights were

threatened by the state's regulation. Id.
65. 106 S. Ct. at 413.
66. Justice Powell was joined by Justice BrennanJustice O'Connor, and ChiefJustice
Burger, who wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment. Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice White and Justice Stevens joined as to Part I,
dissented. Justice Stevens also wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
67. Pacific Gas &Eec. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 914.
68. The regulation at issue in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. required the Pacific Gas and
Electric Company to include the literature of a hostile activist organization, Toward Utility
Rate Normalization (TURN), in its billing envelopes.
69. Id. at 907.
70. Id. at 912.
71.

Id.

72. Id. at 914 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
73. Id. at 915 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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head costs to ratepayers at a rate fixed by law rather than the market
cannot affect the utility's ownership of its property, nor its right to use
that property for expressive purposes. The State could have concluded
that the public interest would be best served by state ownership of utilities.
Having chosen to keep utilities in private hands, however, the State may
not arbitrarilyappropriatepropertyfor the use of third parties by 74
stating
that the public has 'paid'forthe property by paying utility bills.
There is no doubt that utilities are highly regulated. But, as Justice Marshall's comments make clear, utility company property is still private,
and the state must respect that fact.
IV.

CONCLUSION

At the heart of the institution of private property is the right to
manage it, for it would do no good for a state to allow nominal ownership of property while at the same time assuming control over it. A state
may decide to run the utility business itself, but it must pay the existing
owners just compensation for the taking. 75 In other words, if the state
chooses to become the general manager of utility property, it must first
become the owner. If the state wishes to do less than that, then it has to
justify any intrustion on utility management by explaining why the intrusion is necessary to protect the public. If it cannot do so, then the state
has no right to deprive utility companies of the right to manage their
77
property. 7 6 These principles are the essence of due process of law.
The present utility regulatory system has many benefits. Like our
federal government, which functions as well as it does as a result of the
tension between the three branches of government, utility regulation
creates a healthy tension between regulated companies and the regulatory commissions. Utility companies, in order to maintain a favorable
political climate and avoid punitive regulation, are more responsive to
their customers' needs than they would be if they were government
owned. The separation of the roles of management and regulatory
oversight leads to a dynamic environment within which utility companies
are more innovative and responsive to their customers' needs. 78
Some utility managers today reportedly are welcoming greater con74. Id. at 915 n.l (Marshall, J. concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
75. See supra notes 47-49.
76. In a broader context, one commentator has criticized regulatory agencies for what
he describes as "regulatory activism." W. Pond, RestrainingRegulatory Activism: The Proper
Scope of Public Utility Regulation, 35 AD. L. REV. 423 (1983).
77. The new justice on the Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia, made the following observation concerning the fundamental nature of property rights:
Surely the freedom to dispose of one's property as one pleases, for example,
is not as high an aspiration as the freedom to think or write or worship as one's
conscience dictates. On closer analysis, however, it seems to me that the difference between economic freedoms and what are generally called civil rights turns
out to be a difference of degree rather than of kind. Few of us, I suspect, would
have much difficulty choosing between the right to own property and the right to
receive a Miranda warning ....

The Nat. L.J.,June 30, 1986 at 20, col. 3.
78. From conversations with H. Peter Metzger, Manager of Public Affairs Planning,
Public Service Company of Colorado, Summer, 1986.
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trol by the regulatory commissions. Such acquiescence, however, would
indeed be a Faustain bargain that would eventually lead to a stagnant
environment wherein utility customers everywhere will end up paying
much more for much less. The institution of investor-owned utilities is
worth preserving. For those people who wish to do away with it, the
burden is on them to justify why we should eliminate it. In any event,
whatever we decide, we should do so after an honest and thoughtful
debate. We should not let the basic structure separating public and private power silently erode without recognizing what is really happening.

